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What Were Works *Περὶ βίω*?

A Study of the Extant Fragments

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Abstract: For a long time, the exact nature of *Περὶ βίω* literature and its relation to biography has been debated. Scholars have considered such works collections of biographies or philosophical treatises on the right way of life. This paper studies all extant fragments across various philosophical schools. Epicurus and Chrysippus seem to have given practical instructions on the right lifestyle. Clearchus, Dicaearchus and the imperial writers Timotheus and Seleucus, by contrast, took a more anecdotal approach. However, the fragments do not support a reconstruction of biographies in the sense of a description of the life of an individual from birth to death. The anecdotes in Clearchus were probably moralising *exempla*. Moreover, not all biographical fragments of Dicaearchus necessarily belong to his work *On Lives*. I also argue that *Περὶ βίω* works were probably the ideal place for debate and polemic against competing schools.

Keywords: *Περὶ βίω*, biography, philosophy, fragments

1 Introduction

Biography emerged as a historiographical genre in the Hellenistic period. One type of work whose connection with this genre has often been debated is entitled *Περὶ βίω* (*On Lives* or *On Ways of Life*). Such works are attested for several Hellenistic philosophers: Xenocrates (F 2,12 Isnardi Parente), Heraclides Ponticus (F 1,87 Schütrumpf),¹ Theophrastus (F 436,16 *FHS&G*), Strato (F 1,59 Sharples), Clearchus, Dicaearchus, Epicurus and Chrysippus (on the latter four, cf. *infra*).

1 Wehrli (1969a) 17–18; 72 attributed Diog. Laert. 1,25–26 = F 45 Wehrli² = F 81 Schütrumpf (on Thales) to *On Lives*. Cf. also Tsitsiridis (2008) 71 and (2013) 168. However, since that fragment does not cite a book-title, the attribution remains uncertain. Schütrumpf/Stork in Schütrumpf/Stork/Van Ophuijsen/Prince (2008) 161, for instance, also considered *On Happiness*.

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Some scholars have considered these works collections of biographies,² whereas others have regarded them as philosophical treatises.³ This debate is due to the fragmentary preservation of most Hellenistic historiographical and philosophical works. Adding to this confusion is the polysemy of the Greek word βίος, which can mean (1) life, (2) description of a life, i.e. biography and (3) way of life.⁴ An additional problem in the debate is that most modern theories are based only on the fragments of Clearchus and Dicaearchus (ignoring those of Epicurus and Chrysippus).

In order to clarify the nature of works Περί βίων, I shall examine all extant fragments (i.e. those of Clearchus, Dicaearchus, Epicurus, Chrysippus, Timotheus and Seleucus). Before I continue, however, two terminological remarks are in order. First is the term ‘biography’. This genre is generally defined with Momigliano as the description of the life of an individual from birth to death.⁵ Some works, however, contain biographical sections without being biographies proper. Herodotus’ *Histories* and Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, for instance, contain descriptions of the life of Cyrus, although these works can hardly be called biographies. Similarly, certain fragments of lost authors may be biographical (they contain e.g. anecdotes or lists of students), even though the original work was no biography (e.g. Aristotle’s biographical fragments).⁶ Moreover, some ‘biographical’ works may have been *encomia* (cf. Xenophon’s *Agésilas* and Isocrates’ *Evagoras*). Second, the term ‘fragment’ may be misleading. These so-called fragments frequently consist of citations and paraphrases in later directly preserved authors (such as Philodemus, Athenaeus or Diogenes Laertius), who may have got their information through another source (e.g. a handbook or anthology). Verbatim quotations (as, for instance, in the fragments of Euripides) are rare, and even in this case distortions and manipulations are possible.⁷

² Cf. Radicke (1999) 16–17; 250; Cooper (2002) 321–337; Burridge (2004) 70; Zhmud (2012) 66 n. 20. Tsitsiridis (2008) 73 and (2013) 170 considered works Περί βίων part of βίος literature but distinguished them from “Biographie im engeren Sinne”.

³ Cf. Jahn (1856) 286 n. 1; Bickel (1915) 216; Momigliano (1993) 71; Sollenberger (1984) 236; Wehrli/Wöhrle/Zhmud (2004a) 503; Fortenbaugh (2007) 72 and (2011) 175.

⁴ Cf. LSJ s.v. βίος I and V; DGE s.v. βίος B,I,1; 3; 5.

⁵ Momigliano (1993) 11.

⁶ Cf. Schorn (2014) 684–685.

⁷ Cf. Ambaglio in all his publications listed in the bibliography; Brunt (1980); Schepens (1997) and (2000); Lenfant (1999) and (2007); Pelling (2000); Gorman/Gorman (2007); Maisonneuve (2007).

2 The three ways of life according to Aristotle

Since the philosophical interpretation of *Περὶ βίων* literature (cf. *supra*) generally assumes that such works (especially those written by Peripatetics) took up the Aristotelian discussion of the right way of life, Aristotle's views should briefly be presented. On several occasions,⁸ Aristotle expounds his theory of the three ways of life, distinguishing the active or political life (*βίος πρακτικός* or *πολιτικός*), the contemplative or philosophical life (*βίος θεωρητικός* or *φιλόσοφος*), and the sensual life (*βίος ἀπολαυστικός*).⁹ In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (10,7–8,1177a–1179a), he states that the contemplative life leads to the highest form of happiness, since political life is without leisure (*ἄσχυλος*). In his *Politics* (7,3,1325a–b), by contrast, he deems it incorrect to praise inactivity (*τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν*) higher than activity (*τὸ πράττειν*) and considers the active life the best. Aristotle explains, however, that the truly active life is geared towards well-doing (*εὐπραγία*), not despotic rule. Moreover, when distinguishing between the proponents of the contemplative and those of the active life, he claims that both are partly right and partly wrong. In fact, he argues that the intentions (*διάνοιαι*) of the active life concern not only actions *stricto sensu* (as traditional proponents of the active life would claim) but also contemplations and thoughts that exist for their own sake (*τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις*). Thus, Aristotle seems to introduce the contemplative life into the ideal state.¹⁰ The preference for the active life in the *Politics* results from Aristotle's analogy between the individual and the state: since happiness is the same for both (*Pol.* 7,2,1,1324a), their way of life must also be similar.¹¹ Nevertheless, Aristotle's views on the right way

⁸ Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 1,4–5,1215a–1216a; *Eth. Nic.* 1,5,1095b–1096a; *Pol.* 7,2,3–4,1324a; 7,3,1325a–b. Aristotle probably also discussed the three ways of life in his lost *Protrepticus*: cf. Joly (1956) 106–110.

⁹ The distinction between these three ways of life is already anticipated by Pl. *Resp.* 9,580d–581c, who connects the three ways of life with the three parts of the soul: the philosophical life (*φιλόσοφος*) is ruled by reason (*λόγος*), the contentious life (*φιλόνομος*) by temper (*θυμός*) and the gain-loving life (*φιλοκερδής*) by desire (*ἐπιθυμία*). Contrary to Aristotle, Plato presents these three ways of life as mutually exclusive: cf. Joly (1956) 80–87. In his summary of the moral doctrines of Aristotle and the Peripatetics (Stob. 2,7,24, p. 144–145 Wachsmuth), Arius Didymus mentions the active, the contemplative and the mixed life as the three ways of life: he argues that the sensual life is inferior and the contemplative life superior but adds that the wise man will also engage in politics: cf. von Arnim (1926) 83–95; Joly (1956) 148–157.

¹⁰ Cf. Bertelli (2004) 194–195.

¹¹ Arist. *Pol.* 7,2,2,1324a states that the question which mode of life is desirable is merely a side issue (*πάρεργον*) in his discussion: the relevant matter is the ideal constitution and organisation of the state.

of life remain ambiguous.¹² Perhaps this contradiction fuelled later discussions among the Peripatetics (cf. my comments on Dicaearchus in § 4 *infra*).

3 Clearchus of Soli

Clearchus was a pupil of Aristotle. From his work *Περὶ βίῳ*n, thirty fragments have been preserved, most of which are quoted by Athenaeus.¹³ Almost all fragments offer (sensational) biographical examples of pleasure, decadence and depravity of individuals, cities or nations.¹⁴ Thus, they appear to illustrate what Aristotle dubs the sensual life (*βίος ἀπολαυστικός*), i.e. the life of pleasure.

- (1) Individuals: Dionysius II (F 47 Wehrli²), Darius III (F 50–51a–d Wehrli²), Polycrates of Samus (F 44 Wehrli²), Sappho (F 41 Wehrli²), the painter Parrhasius (F 41–42 Wehrli²), Pithyllus (F 54 Wehrli²), the poet Philoxenus (F 57 Wehrli²), the tragedian Melanthius (F 55 Wehrli²), the piper Charmus (F 58 Wehrli²), the philosopher Anaxarchus (F 60 Wehrli²), the tyrant Phalaris (F 61 Wehrli²), the Persian Cantibaris (F 52 Wehrli²), Sagaris of Mariandynia (F 53 Wehrli²), the mythical Tithonus (F 55–56 Wehrli²)
- (2) Cities and nations: Spartans (F 39 Wehrli²), Milesians (F 45 Wehrli²), Tarentines (F 48 Wehrli²), Sicilians (F 59 Wehrli²), Lydians (F 43a–b Wehrli²), Scythians (F 46 Wehrli²), Medes (F 49 Wehrli²), Persians (F 49 Wehrli²)

A few other fragments should be added to this group collected in Wehrli's edition. According to Nenci, an additional fragment is found in Ath. 12,24,522f–523b, which mentions the decadence of the Iapygians and immediately follows F 48 Wehrli² = Ath. 12,23,522d–f (on the ὕβρις of the Tarentines against the Iapygian city Carbina).¹⁵ Despite doubts expressed by Gorman and Gorman,¹⁶ the

¹² For Aristotle's views on the ways of life, cf. Grilli (1953) 125–129; Joly (1956) 110–127; Frongia (1976) 69–81 and the collection of papers in Lisi (2004).

¹³ The title is cited in 23 fragments. For 3 more fragments, the attribution to *Περὶ βίῳ*n is confirmed by parallel fragments that do mention the title (F 43b; F 51c–d Wehrli²). Another 4 fragments can be attributed to *Περὶ βίῳ*n because of other links with fragments that cite the title (F 44; F 54–55; F 57 Wehrli²), thus bringing the total to 30 fragments. Incidentally, some fragments included by Wehrli (1969b) under *Παροσμῖαι* might belong to *On Lives* instead: e.g. F 68 Wehrli² (on Diomedes' depraved daughters) and F 77 Wehrli² (on the wealthy Callicrates). Crusius (1883) 83 attributed Zen. 5,44 = F 65 Wehrli² (on Οἰτάριος δαίμων) to *Περὶ βίῳ*n.

¹⁴ According to Tsitsiridis (2008) 68–69 and (2013) 159–160, Clearchus' treatment of nations was geographically ordered.

¹⁵ Nenci (1989).

¹⁶ Gorman/Gorman (2010) 194–195.

attribution to Clearchus is probably correct. Taïfakos included Nenci's fragment along with the subsequent sections in Athenaeus, i.e. Ath. 12,25,523b–c on the Iberians (= F 24 Taïfakos) and 12,25,523c on the Massaliotes (= F 25a Taïfakos).¹⁷ The latter fragment is paralleled by Zenobius Athous L 1,60 Leutsch/Schneidewin (M III 91).¹⁸ This is the beginning of a cluster of proverbs in Zenobius Athous derived from Clearchus.¹⁹ For this reason, it is likely that Ath. 12,23–25,522d–523c is entirely derived from Clearchus' *On Lives*. Other fragments from the same series of proverbs in Zenobius Athous that should be attributed to Clearchus' *On Lives* are Zenobius Athous L 1,61 Leutsch/Schneidewin (M III 92) = F 18b Taïfakos (on the Samian 'laurel' and 'flowers'; cf. Clearchus F 44 Wehrli²) and L 1,62 Leutsch/Schneidewin (M III 93) = F 20b Taïfakos (on the saying 'from the Scythians'; cf. Clearchus F 46 Wehrli²).²⁰ Comparison with the fragments of Clearchus in Zenobius Vulgatus shows that Laurentianus 80.13 (L), the sole witness for this series of proverbs in Zenobius Athous, generally omits Clearchus' name, originally cited by Zenobius.²¹ Another 'new' fragment is Ath.

¹⁷ Taïfakos (2007) 26–29; 276–278. Cf. Tsitsiridis (2008) 66 and (2013) 156–157; 158.

¹⁸ On the textual transmission of Zenobius and the difference between Zenobius Athous and Zenobius Vulgatus, cf. especially Bühler (1982) 33–290.

¹⁹ Zenobius Athous L 1,61–69 Leutsch/Schneidewin (M III 91–100) ~ Clearchus F 44; F 46; F 51b; F 40; F 3; F 11; F 56; F 65 Wehrli² (in this order). Zenobius Athous L 1,66 Leutsch/Schneidewin (M III 97) is also paralleled by a newly found fragment of Clearchus in Phot. *Lex.* A 408 Theodoridis (= F 83 Taïfakos). Only Zenobius Athous L 1,65 Leutsch/Schneidewin (M III 96) does not have a parallel fragment. Cf. Taïfakos (2007) 278–279, who erroneously spoke of the pseudo-Plutarchean *Proverbia Alexandrina* (instead of Zenobius Athous). The same error recurs in Tsitsiridis (2013) 158. A (pseudo-)Plutarchean work entitled *Alexandrian Proverbs* does exist. It is the fifth collection of proverbs in Laurentianus 80.13. However, the title Πλουτάρχου παροιμίας αἱς Ἀλεξανδρεῖς ἐχρῶντο was erroneously added as a *subscriptio* to the fourth collection of proverbs in L, which actually transmits the third book of Zenobius Athous. Cf. especially Crusius (1883) 14–15; (1885) 225 and (1887) xviii–xix. This error is often repeated on the authority of Leutsch/Schneidewin (1839) xxxv–xxxvi; 321–342, who, on the basis of the *subscriptio*, attributed the fourth collection in L to Plutarch. The (pseudo-)Plutarchean work has been published by Crusius (1887). It is also listed in Lamprias 142 (Περὶ τῶν παρ' Ἀλεξανδρεῶσι παροιμιῶν).

²⁰ The explanation in Zenobius differs from that in the other fragment of Clearchus. However, a similar divergence is seen in the explanation of the expression "the brain of Zeus" (Διὸς ἐγκέφαλος) in F 51a–d Wehrli².

²¹ Cf. Zenobius Athous L 1,63 Leutsch/Schneidewin (M III 94) (τὰ γὰρ πολυτελῆ βρώματα etc.) vs. Zenobius Vulgatus 3,41 = Clearchus F 51b Wehrli² (Κλέαρχος δὲ ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ Περὶ βίων φησὶ τὰ πολυτελῆ βρώματα etc.); Zenobius Athous L 1,64 Leutsch/Schneidewin (M III 95) (φασὶ συμβαίνειν τι etc.) vs. Zenobius Vulgatus 4,87 = Clearchus F 40 Wehrli² (Κλέαρχος <ἐν> τῷ Περὶ βίων φησὶ συμβαίνειν τι etc.); Zenobius Athous L 1,68 Leutsch/Schneidewin (M III 99) (ὁ γὰρ Τιθωνὸς ... τέττιξ ἐγένετο) vs. Zenobius Vulgatus 6,18 = Clearchus F 56 Wehrli² (Ἰστορεῖται δὲ ὅτι Τιθωνὸς ... τέττιξ ἐγένετο, ὡς φησὶ Κλέαρχος ἐν τῷ Περὶ βίων); Zenobius Athous L 1,69 Leutsch/Schneidewin

12,72,548f–549a (on Tithonus and Melanthius). Tsitsiridis attributed this section to Clearchus because of the parallel with F 55 Wehrli² (which also compares Melanthius and Tithonus).²²

Only rarely does Clearchus give a positive example: e.g. Sappho and the painter Parrhasius are adduced as examples of people who combined daintiness (ἀβρότης) with virtue (ἀρετή) (F 41–42 Wehrli²).²³ According to Cooper, these examples were adduced by an interlocutor advocating the life of pleasure.²⁴ The only other positive example is Gorgias (F 62 Wehrli²), who said that he lived for so long because he avoided pleasure (ἡδονή). In other words, the few positive examples are also cited in the context of pleasure and decadence.

Two fragments are not anecdotal: F 37 Wehrli² (on the semantic change of the word παράσιτος from an official to a person that dines at the tables of others) and F 40 Wehrli² (on the origin of the word λευκηπατίας “coward”, which was used because an affection of the liver [ἥπαρ] makes people cowards). The fragment on the word παράσιτος may be connected with the Clearchan anecdote on the parasite Philoxenus (F 57 Wehrli²). The fragment on λευκηπατίας may be a digression on cowards; since cowardice may be a manifestation or result of τρυφή (a weak person is not accustomed to war and may therefore become a coward), the fragment may belong to a discussion of the life of pleasure as well. Clearchus apparently liked using proverbs and other types of sayings in connection with his anecdotes (cf. F 43a–b; F 45; F 46; F 51a–d; F 56 Wehrli²).²⁵ On F 38 Wehrli² (the theory of soul of the Pythagorean Euxitheus), cf. *infra*.

Clearchus (both in *Περὶ βίων* and in other of his works) also liked using quotations from poets: e.g. Sappho (F 41 Wehrli²), an epigram of Parrhasius (F 41–42 Wehrli²), Anaxilas (F 60 Wehrli²), Philoxenus (F 57 Wehrli²) and perhaps Antiphanes (F 39 Wehrli²).²⁶ Thus, the picture arising from these fragments is that of a moralistic, literary work with special attention for the sensual life. The work

(M III 100) (οὗτος ὁ δαίμων ὕβριν etc.) vs. Zenobius Vulgatus 5,44 = Clearchus F 65 Wehrli² (Κλέαρχος φησιν ὅτι δαίμων τις Οἰταῖος ἐπωνομάσθη, ὃς ὕβριν etc.); Zenobius Athous L 2,11 Leutsch/Schneidewin (M III 151) (Καλλικράτης τις etc.) vs. Zenobius Vulgatus 6,29 = Clearchus F 77 Wehrli² (Κλέαρχος φησιν ὅτι Καλλικράτης τις etc.).

²² Tsitsiridis (2006); (2008) 67; (2013) 158.

²³ Parrhasius, however, only laid claim to virtue ‘in word’ (λόγῳ), i.e. in his epigram quoted by Clearchus (ἀβροδίατος ἀνὴρ ἀρετὴν τε σέβων τάδ’ ἔγραψεν | Παρράσιος).

²⁴ Cooper (2002) 328.

²⁵ Clearchus also wrote a work *On Proverbs* (Περὶ παροιμιῶν): cf. F 63,I; F 64; F 66a; F 66c; F 73; F 75; F 78; F 80–81; F 83 Wehrli².

²⁶ It is uncertain whether the fragment of Antiphanes in Ath. 15,28,681c was quoted through Clearchus or through another source.

may have been a dialogue.²⁷ The focus on the sensual life, however, may result from Athenaeus' preference for sensational anecdotes and the theme of *τρυφή* (most Clearchan fragments are quoted by Athenaeus). Hence, although almost all fragments focus on the life of pleasure, Bollansée argued that Clearchus' *Περὶ βίων* discussed the three Aristotelian types of life, rejecting the view that the sole theme was *τρυφή*.²⁸

Recently, Gorman and Gorman have challenged the *communis opinio* that Clearchus' fragments reflect the pattern of *τρυφή* leading to *ὑβρις* and the ultimate demise of an individual or nation.²⁹ In their view, certain stock phrases such as εἰς τοσοῦτο προελθεῖν τρυφῆς ὥστε "become so addicted to luxury that" or διὰ τρυφῆν "because of luxury" were probably absent in Clearchus and added by Athenaeus. Such additions are mainly found in introductory and transitional sentences.³⁰ According to Gorman and Gorman, even the link between *τρυφή* and *ὑβρις* may be attributed to Athenaeus instead of Clearchus.³¹ However, the word *τρυφή* is also found outside introductory and transitional phrases.³² Moreover, the view that decadence can lead to one's demise is obviously present in Clearchus' fragments (even if the explicit conclusion at the end of the anecdotes may be Athenaeus').³³ Nevertheless, Gorman and Gorman were right to point out the danger of distortions by Athenaeus in certain anecdotes.

That Clearchus' *Περὶ βίων* was not merely a collection of anecdotes about the sensual life is indicated by F 38 Wehrli². It presents the theory of soul of a certain Pythagorean Euxitheus (otherwise unknown), who on the basis of his σῶμα-σῆμα

27 Cf. Wehrli (1969b) 58; Cooper (2002) 327–329; Tsitsiridis (2008) 69–70 and (2013) 160–161. The dialogue form is suggested by the use of the second person plural (ὑμεῖς δὲ οἴσθε) in F 41 Wehrli². If F 16 Wehrli² also derives from *Περὶ βίων*, it may contain another such indication (ζῆτε; ὑμεῖς ... τηρεῖτε; ὑμῖν; οὐτε γὰρ συνανθρωπίζετε οὐτε διαγινώσκετε; ζῆτε; μελετᾶτε). Cf. Tsitsiridis (2008) 69 and (2013) 161. However, these words may have been introduced by Athenaeus (whose *Deipnosophists* is written in the form of a dialogue). For a possible reconstruction of the dialogue, cf. Tsitsiridis (2008) 70 and (2013) 161–162.

28 Bollansée (2008). Cf. Tsitsiridis (2013) 171.

29 Gorman/Gorman (2010). Cf. also Gorman/Gorman (2007) 58–59 n. 80. For the traditional view on Clearchus, cf. Tsitsiridis (2008) 70–71 and (2013) 162–163.

30 Cf. also Gorman/Gorman (2007) 44–45. Tsitsiridis (2013) 165–166 n. 44, however, rejected this argument.

31 For their view on the history of the concept of "catastrophic luxury", cf. Gorman/Gorman (2007) 54–58.

32 Cf. F 41 (εἰς τρυφῆν); F 42 (τρυφῆσας); F 43a (τρυφερώτερον); F 45 (τρυφῆν); F 49 (τρυφῆς) Wehrli².

33 Such a decline is seen in the fragments on the Lydians (F 43a Wehrli²), Scythians (F 46 Wehrli²) and Tarentines (F 48 Wehrli²). For an elaborate discussion (against Gorman/Gorman), cf. Tsitsiridis (2013) 163–167.

views argued against suicide (F 38 Wehrli²).³⁴ With its more straightforward philosophical theme, the fragment indicates a philosophical interest behind the anecdotes preserved in Athenaeus. One fragment that perhaps should also be attributed to *Περὶ βίων* with Müller and Tsitsiridis is F 16 Wehrli², which rejects the life of a cynic.³⁵ Wehrli attributed the fragment to *Περὶ παιδείας*,³⁶ but the topic of a lifestyle that should be avoided fits *Περὶ βίων* better. In the recent edition by Taïfakos, the fragment is included among the fragments *Περὶ βίων*.³⁷

Can Clearchus' work then be considered a collection of biographies, as is often assumed, a biography being a description of the life of an individual from birth to death? Since many fragments deal with cities or nations (and not just individuals), this seems unlikely, unless 'biography' is used metaphorically as the description of the 'life' of a nation. However, few fragments support the reconstruction of such a life. A strong argument in support of the 'biographical' theory is Athenaeus' frequent use of the alternative title *Βίοι* (instead of *Περὶ βίων*).³⁸ Ancient biographies were often entitled *Βίος* + genitive (e.g. Aristoxenus' *Βίος Πυθαγόρου* and *Βίος Πλάτωνος*) or *Βίοι* (e.g. Satyrus' *Βίοι*). However, given the polysemy of the Greek word *βίος* (cf. § 1 supra), the title may also mean *Ways of Life* instead of *Biographies*. Even actual ancient biographies have this ethical orientation: the subject is frequently used as a biographical example of a certain human characteristic.³⁹ Alternatively, Athenaeus may have chosen the title *Βίοι* because of the many anecdotes. Indeed, anecdotes were among the main components of biographical works. In other words, the title *Βίοι* does not necessarily mean that Clearchus' work consisted of biographies. In fact, many of the persons were too obscure to be the subject of an entire biography.

³⁴ This Pythagorean may have been a (perhaps fictional) character in a dialogue: cf. Wehrli (1969b) 59; Tsitsiridis (2013) 161.

³⁵ Cf. Müller (1848) 310; Tsitsiridis (2008) 66–67 and (2013) 157–158; 161; 162.

³⁶ Wehrli (1969b) 13; 50–51. Wehrli also considered *Περὶ βίων*.

³⁷ Taïfakos (2007) 12–13; 243–244.

³⁸ According to Fuhr (1841) 41, the correct title was *Βίοι*. However, that *Περὶ βίων* was the original title is confirmed by two fragments in Zenobius: Zen. 4,87 = F 40 Wehrli²; Zen. 3,41 = F 51b Wehrli². Athenaeus cites the work by its original title five times: Ath. 15,35,687a–c = F 41 Wehrli²; Ath. 12,11,515e–516c = F 43a Wehrli²; Ath. 12,55,539b = F 50 Wehrli²; Ath. 8,32,344c = F 58 Wehrli²; Ath. 9,54,396e = F 61 Wehrli².

³⁹ Cf. Burridge (2004) 145–146; Schorn (2014) 681.

4 Dicaearchus of Messana

Dicaearchus, another pupil of Aristotle, also wrote a work entitled *Περὶ βίωv*. Although the title is attested only once in a fragment relating that in his youth Plato wrestled at the Isthmian Games (F 47 Mirhady),⁴⁰ most scholars have attributed all other biographical fragments of Dicaearchus (on the Seven Sages, Pythagoras and Plato) to this work, too.⁴¹ Fuhr and Müller even assumed that the original title was *Βίοι (φιλοσόφων)*.⁴² Here, the argument risks becoming circular: first, *Περὶ βίωv* works are assumed to have consisted of biographies, and therefore all biographical fragments of Dicaearchus are attributed to this work; these fragments in their turn are then taken as evidence for the theory that *Περὶ βίωv* works included biographies. Several scholars have explained these biographical fragments as illustrations of either the active or contemplative life (thus combining the ‘biographical’ and ‘philosophical’ interpretation of *Περὶ βίωv* literature).⁴³ That Dicaearchus dealt with the right way of life is indicated by Cic. *Att.* 2,16,3 (= F 33 Mirhady = Theophr. F 481 *FHS&G*), who mentions a controversy between Dicaearchus and Theophrastus, the former preferring the active and the latter the contemplative life.⁴⁴ Debate about the importance of the political life may be the result of Aristotle’s ambiguous position (cf. § 2 *supra*). In Dicaearchus, the Seven Sages may indeed have illustrated the active life, since he describes them as politically engaged men (F 36–37 Mirhady). White even reconstructed Dicaearchus’ *Περὶ βίωv* as a history of philosophy,⁴⁵ running from the Seven Sages (whose wisdom consisted of actions)⁴⁶ to Pythagoras (who introduced speeches),⁴⁷

40 The fragment is cited in Diog. Laert. 3,4–5. Most editors of Dicaearchus have also included the subsequent information in Diogenes Laertius on Plato’s education in painting and early poetic production (dithyrambs, lyric poetry and tragedies): cf. Fuhr (1841) 53 n. 11; Müller (1848) 243; Wehrli (1967) 21; Mirhady (2001) 52. Wehrli and Mirhady also included the preceding information in Diogenes on Plato’s grammar teacher Dionysius and gymnastic teacher Aristo (separated from the rest of the fragment by a digression on Plato’s name change, which is not derived from Dicaearchus, since it cites later authors, viz. Alexander Polyhistor [*FGrHist* 273 F 88] and Neanthes [*FGrHist* 84 F 21a]). However, it remains uncertain whether all this information can be attributed to Dicaearchus.

41 Cf. among others Martini (1903) 552–553; Wehrli (1968) 529–530; Gaiser (1988) 307–308; Schneider (1994) 761; White (2001); Cooper (2002) 332–335; Wehrli/Wöhrlé/Zhmud (2004b) 570–571.

42 Fuhr (1841) 40–41; Müller (1848) 243.

43 Jaeger (1948) 450–452; White (2001) 196–198; Cooper (2002) 332.

44 Cf. also F 8 and F 34 Mirhady.

45 White (2001).

46 F 36–38 Mirhady.

47 F 40–42 Mirhady.

Socrates (who invented the dialectical method)⁴⁸ and finally Plato (who joined the various branches of philosophy and introduced the literary dialogue).⁴⁹

However, White's reconstruction lacks evidence. The alleged fragment on Socrates (F 43 Mirhady), for instance, probably did not deal with Socrates at all. It is cited in Plut. *An seni* 26,796c–e, who discusses common misconceptions about philosophy and argues that real philosophy is practised in daily life, not in a school. As an example of a real philosopher, he mentions Socrates. Although the context is a (biographical) discussion of Socrates, the citation of Dicaearchus is probably limited to the semantic change of περιπατεῖν (from “walk” to “discourse in the porticoes”), which serves as another misconception about philosophy. Moreover, the biographical fragments may be derived from other works of Dicaearchus. Some may belong to the *Life of Greece* (Βίος Ἑλλάδος), a cultural history of Greece running from prehistory to Dicaearchus' own time.⁵⁰ Pythagoras' life, for instance, was also discussed in Timaeus' *Histories* (FGrHist 566 F 13–14; F 16–17; F 131–132); details about Plato's life were found in Philochorus' *Atthis* (FGrHist 328 F 59). Indeed, as I have said in the introduction (§ 1 supra), some historiographical works contain biographical information but are not actual biographies. Another work of Dicaearchus that may have contained biographical information is the *Circuit of the Earth* (Γῆς περίοδος), a geographical survey of the known world. Eudoxus' work with the same title, for instance, contained discussions about Protagoras (F 307 Lasserre) and Pythagoras (F 325 Lasserre).⁵¹ Since no complete list of Dicaearchus' works is extant, some fragments may belong to unattested works.

Finally, previous scholarship⁵² may have overemphasised the above-mentioned fragment in Cicero on the controversy between Dicaearchus and Theophrastus. The context of Cicero's letter to Atticus is the political turmoil at the time of the triumvirate. By retreating to his house in Formiae, Cicero claims to practise the contemplative life, whereas his previous involvement in Roman politics was part of his active life. Cicero takes Dicaearchus and Theophrastus as icons of both lifestyles, but this may be an exaggeration. Indeed, another frag-

48 F 43 Mirhady.

49 F 45–50 Mirhady.

50 For the fragments on the Seven Sages, the attribution to the *Life of Greece* was suggested by Cavallaro (1971) 218 and Huby (2001) 324. According to Koepke (1856) 11, all biographical fragments of Dicaearchus should be attributed to the *Life of Greece*.

51 Eudoxus' fragment on the prize of wisdom passed around among the Seven Sages (F 371 Lasserre = FGrHist 1006 F 1) is also frequently attributed to the *Circuit of the Earth*: cf. Gisinger (1921) 63; Lasserre (1966) 266–267; Bollansée (1998) 170–171.

52 Cf. Jaeger (1948) 450–451; Grilli (1953) 130–132; Wehrli (1967) 50–51; Fortenbaugh (2011) 393–396.

ment (F 479 *FHS&G*) shows that Theophrastus was not an extreme proponent of the contemplative life but argued that the perfect man both contemplates reality and performs his duties (καὶ θεωρητικὸν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν δεόντων), i.e. combines the active and contemplative life.⁵³ Dicaearchus' alleged preference for the active life, on the other hand, did not prevent him from praising the leisured life of the Golden Age as the best in his *Life of Greece* (F 56a Mirhady). This is not to say that Dicaearchus and Theophrastus did not discuss the right way of life at all. In fact, it would be odd for Cicero to draw the comparison with the two Peripatetics if they did not.⁵⁴ However, the alleged controversy between these philosophers probably does not reflect any actual debate between them.⁵⁵ Despite all these limitations, the one fragment that does attest the title is 'biographical'. However, the 'biographical' fragments need not constitute actual biographies (in the sense of a description of a life from birth to death). Dicaearchus may have used biographical anecdotes to make a philosophical point (as Clearchus seems to have done). The fragment on Plato's career as a wrestler may derive, for instance, from a discussion of the life of athletes.

5 Epicurus

A completely different picture arises from Epicurus' work *Περὶ βίωv* (in four books).⁵⁶ The scanty fragments deal with the following topics:⁵⁷

53 On Theophrastus' views of the contemplative life, cf. Joly (1956) 135–137 and Bénatouïl (2012).

54 Theophrastus' interest in the right way of life is attested in two further fragments: F 465 *FHS&G* (where he laments the lack of interest among many in the question of the right way of life) and F 476 *FHS&G* (where he admits that it is difficult to choose the best life and even more difficult to stick with it).

55 Cf. Huby (2001). Recently, Fortenbaugh (2013) has changed his views (cf. n. 52): on the basis of other letters from Cicero to Atticus (*Att.* 2,2; 2,12; 2,13), he has convincingly argued that the supposed conflict between both Peripatetics is a creation of Cicero.

56 Cf. Diog. Laert. 10,28.

57 There are two fragments for which the title is uncertain. In F 13 Usener (= Phld. *De Pietate* col. 26,730–747 Obbink, *PHerc.* 1098 fr. 13 = F 134 Arrighetti³), which argues that praying is natural, Usener (1887) 96, Philippson (1921) 386 and Obbink (1996) 156 supplemented the title as *Περὶ [βίωv]*, although *Περὶ [θεῶv]* is equally possible: cf. Gomperz (1866) 128; Bücheler (1865) 541. The second fragment (dealing with rhetoric) is found in Phld. *De rhetorica* 2, *PHerc.* 1674, col. 52, p. 151 Longo Auricchio, where von Arnim (1893) 5 and Longo Auricchio (1977) 151 reconstructed the title as ἐν τοῖς [*Περὶ βίωv*], on the basis of the reference to this work in a similar context in Phld. *De rhetorica* 2, *PHerc.* 1674 col. 57, p. 161 Longo Auricchio (= *PHerc.* 1672 col. 8, p. 165 Longo Auricchio = Epicurus F 11 Usener). Sudhaus (1892) 90, by contrast, did not supplement the lacuna. Arrighetti (1973) 165 attributed Phld. *De rhetorica* 8, *PHerc.* 1015 col. 54, 10–17, p. 58–59 Sudhaus

- F 1,119 Arrighetti²: instructions for the wise man (books 1–2)
- F 1,136 Arrighetti²: essence of pleasure (ἡδονή) (book 1)
- F 10,1 Arrighetti²: rejection of political rhetoric as an art (book 1)⁵⁸
- F 11 Usener: Περὶ βίων does not discuss sophistic rhetoric⁵⁹
- F 10,3 Arrighetti²: prostration (no book-number)
- F 1,30 Arrighetti²: Περὶ βίων deals with ethics
- F 10,2 Arrighetti²: unclear (book 3)⁶⁰

Especially of interest are the first two fragments. In F 1,119 Arrighetti² (= Diog. Laert. 10,119), Epicurus gives the following prescriptions for the wise man:

οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι (sc. τὸν σοφόν), ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ βίων (sc. Ἐπικούρος φησιν)· οὐδὲ τυραννεύσειν· οὐδὲ κυνιεῖν, ὡς ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ Περὶ βίων· οὐδὲ πτωχεύσειν. ἀλλὰ κἂν πηρωθῇ τὰς ὀψεις <οὐκ> ἐξάξειν αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου, ὡς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ φησι.⁶¹

“Nor will he (sc. the wise man) engage in politics, as he (sc. Epicurus) says in the first book *On Lives*; nor will he be a tyrant. Nor will he become a Cynic, as he says in the second book *On Lives*; nor will he be a mendicant. But even if he loses his eye-sight, he will not take his life, as he says in the same book.”

II (= F 10,4 Arrighetti²) to Epicurus’ Περὶ βίων, despite the absence of a book-title. The fragment itself reports a polemic against Aristotle, who is presented as an even greater enemy of the safety of life than those who prepare themselves for politics. Finally, Epicurus seems to refer to his work in his letter to Pythocles (F 3,86 Arrighetti²= Diog. Laert. 10,86: τοῖς περὶ βίων λόγοις): cf. Joly (1956) 143.

58 In F 20,3 Arrighetti², the profession of forensic orators is called κακοτεχνία.

59 In his work *On Rhetoric* (F 20,5 Arrighetti²), Epicurus argues that sophistic rhetoric does not help in politics. Likewise, Phld. *De rhetorica* 3, *PHerc.* 1506, col. 40,17–31, p. 241–242 Sudhaus II states that a rhetorician should have experience in politics.

60 F 10,2 Arrighetti² is cited in Phld. *De morte* 4, *PHerc.* 1050 col. 1,13–18. Unfortunately, this part of the papyrus is hard to read because of the large lacunae. Since the context is a discussion of death, the fragment may have dealt with the wise man’s attitude towards death. Gigante (1983) 116–117 supplemented the text as ὅτι δ’ [ἐν τῷ νῦν προ]κειμένῳ τῷ λεχθ[έντι τὸ Σωκρά]τειον βοηθεῖ πάλι[ν αὐτὸς διὰ τοῦ] τρίτου Περὶ βίων δοκ[εῖ δεῖξαι], which can be translated as “and he himself appears to indicate in the third book *On Lives* again that in what has now been set out the Socratic argument helps what was said”. This text was adopted in the edition of Epicurus by Arrighetti (1973) 164. According to Gigante (1983) 129, in describing the Epicurean conception of death as a “loss of perception” (στέρησις αἰσθήσεως), Epicurus referred to Socrates’ opinion on death as expressed in Pl. *Ap.* 40c–e. This “Socratic argument” ([Σωκρά]τειον) is dropped, however, in the reconstruction of the text by Henry (2009) 2–5: ὅτι δ[.....] | κειμένῳ τῷ λεχθ[έντι πρό]τερον βοηθεῖ παλο[.... τοῦ] | τρίτου περὶ βίων δου[.....], which he translated as “And that ... helps [the subject (?) mentioned [before] ... [the] third (book) of *On Lives* ...”.

61 The text is that of Dorandi (2013) 802. Note that <οὐκ> ἐξάξειν is a conjecture for μετάξειν or μεταξύει (read by the manuscripts).

Epicurus addresses the topic of political engagement, also treated by Aristotle in his discussion of the ways of life (cf. § 2 *supra*) and by various Peripatetics (among others Theophrastus and Dicaearchus: cf. § 4 *supra*). According to Bignone, the fragment attacks the Aristotelian views on political involvement.⁶² That Epicurus advised against engaging in politics is confirmed by other ancient testimonies.⁶³ Sen. *Dial.* 8,3,2 (= Epicurus F 9 Usener), however, specifies that the wise man will not partake in politics, except in an emergency. Moreover, Epicurus (F 555 Usener) allowed ambitious men (*φιλότιμοι καὶ φιλόδοξοι*) to partake in politics, since freedom from politics (*ἀπραγμοσύνη*) would disturb and harm them. The rejection of a cynic lifestyle (*οὐδὲ κυνιεῖν*)⁶⁴ and of suicide is also found in Clearchus F 16 Wehrli² (*τὸν κυνικὸν βίον*) and F 38 Wehrli² respectively, the latter fragment explicitly citing Clearchus' *Περὶ βίων*.

F 1,136 Arrighetti² (= Diog. Laert. 10,136) opposes the Epicurean concept of pleasure (*ἡδονή*) to that of the Cyrenaics:

διαφέρεται δὲ (sc. Ἐπίκουρος) πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναίους περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει· ὁ δὲ ἀμφοτέρω ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὡς φησιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τέλους καὶ ἐν τῷ α' Περὶ βίων καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μιτυλήνῃ φίλους ἐπιστολῇ.⁶⁵

"He (sc. Epicurus) differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. For the latter do not include pleasure in rest but only pleasure in motion. Epicurus, by contrast, includes both, pleasure of mind as well as pleasure of body, as he says in *On Choice and Avoidance*, in *On the End*, in the first book *On Lives* and in his letter to his friends in Mitylene."

Epicurus' distinction between "pleasure in rest" (*ἡδονὴ καταστηματική*) and "pleasure in motion" (*ἡδονὴ ἐν κινήσει*) is also attested in Cic. *Fin.* 2,9 and F 7 Arrighetti² (from Epicurus' *On Choice and Avoidance*, which is also cited in the above-mentioned text). It differs from the pleasure-concept of the Cyrenaics (Diog. Laert. 2,86–93), according to whom pain and pleasure are always in motion, whereas rest is the result of the absence of both pleasure and pain. In his

⁶² Bignone (1973) I, 417.

⁶³ Cic. *Att.* 14,20,5; *Fam.* 7,12; Plut. *Adv. Col.* 33,1127a. Cf. *Sententiae Vaticanae* 58; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 20,3. A similar anti-political statement is found in Phld. *De rhetorica* 8, *PHerc.* 1015, col. 38,7–12, p. 35 Sudhaus II and col. 55,16–20 and *PHerc.* 832 col. 44, p. 60–61 Sudhaus II. In *De rhetorica*, *PHerc.* 1078/1080, fr. 13, p. 154–155 Sudhaus II, Philodemus explains that, even though philosophers do not partake in politics, they will serve their country by instructing young men to obey the laws.

⁶⁴ Erler (1994) 86 interpreted the ban on being a mendicant (*οὐδὲ πτωχεύσειν*) as synonymous with the rejection of the life of a cynic. Grilli (1953) 54 connected the instruction with the Epicurean principle of *αὐτάρκεια* (F 4,130 Arrighetti² = Diog. Laert. 10,130).

⁶⁵ The text is that of Dorandi (2013) 812–813.

letter to Menoeceus (F 4,131 Arrighetti² = Diog. Laert. 10,131),⁶⁶ by contrast, Epicurus explains that pleasure is the absence of physical pain (ἄπονία) and of mental trouble (ἀταραξία),⁶⁷ i.e. rest does not exist as a third category separated from pleasure and pain (as the Cyrenaics claim).⁶⁸

The extant fragments indicate that Epicurus' *Περὶ βίων* treated the preferable way of life, although its content was broader than the question of political involvement. Indeed, Diog. Laert. 10,30 (= F 1,30 Arrighetti²) lists *On Lives* among the ethical writings (along with Epicurus' letters and *On the End*). One may wonder whether Epicurus' discussion on ἡδονή was also an implicit reaction to Aristotle and the Peripatetics' rejection of the sensual life. Although we should not project the Aristotelian system of the three ways of life onto Epicurus, a work *Περὶ βίων* was probably the ideal place for Epicurus to challenge the Aristotelian view of ἡδονή and to expound his own views of the happy (i.e. right) way of life.⁶⁹ Contrary to Clearchus' work, the fragments of Epicurus' *Περὶ βίων* show no interest in anecdotes. Indeed, a historical interest is absent in the rest of Epicurus' work, too.

⁶⁶ Epicurus' *Περὶ βίων* may have had more themes in common with the letter to Menoeceus, since according to Diog. Laert. 10,29 this letter treated τὰ περὶ βίων.

⁶⁷ The definition of pleasure as the absence of pain may be a polemic against Pl. *Grg.* 496c–497a and Pl. *Phlb.* 46b–50d, where Plato describes the existence of the mixed pleasure, consisting of both pleasure and pain: cf. Erler (1994) 156.

⁶⁸ On Epicurus' pleasure in motion and pleasure in rest, cf. Grilli (1953) 35–40; Erler (1994) 155–157.

⁶⁹ In his letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus alludes to two Aristotelian concepts: θεωρία and φρόνησις. In connection with the Epicurean theme of 'choice and aversion', Epicurus claims that an ἀπλανής θεωρία leads to physical health and tranquillity of mind (F 4,128 Arrighetti² = Diog. Laert. 10,128) and considers φρόνησις the beginning and greatest Good (F 4,132 Arrighetti² = Diog. Laert. 10,132). He explains that by pleasure (ἡδονή) he does not mean sensuality (ἀπόλαυσις) (F 4,131 Arrighetti² = Diog. Laert. 10,131): this might be a reaction to Aristotle's βίος ἀπολαυστικός, which took ἡδονή as its sole Good (Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1,5,1,1095b). On Epicurus' concept of ἀπλανής θεωρία, cf. Erler (2012). Moreover, Epicurus specifies that ἡδονή does not consist of the enjoyment of boys, women, fish and all the other delicacies of a luxurious table, which may be an implicit reaction to Clearchus' concept of ἡδονή: cf. the report on the Tarentines violating the boys, girls and younger women of Carbina (F 48 Wehrli²) and the reference to Sicilian tables known for their luxuriousness (F 59 Wehrli²). A similar reaction to Clearchus might be found in Diogenes of Oenoanda F 29, col. 2,8–10 Smith, who says that the purpose of life does not consist of a dainty life (ἀβροδίαιτος βίος) nor of the wealth of tables; the adjective ἀβροδίαιτος is also found e.g. in Clearchus' description of the painter Parrhasius (F 41–42 Wehrli²). On Epicurus' polemic against the lost works of Aristotle and the early Peripatetics, cf. Bignone (1973).

6 Chrysippus of Soli

Most of the ten fragments of the Stoic Chrysippus' work *On Lives* are quoted in Plutarch's *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* and a few in Diogenes Laertius. The bulk of the fragments give instructions about the wise man's life.

- SVF III F 691: relation to kings; suicide (book 1)
- SVF III F 697: participation in politics (book 1)
- SVF III F 716: love for young men and definition of love (book 1)
- SVF III F 703: a wise man is free from politics (ἀπράγμων) (book 4)
- SVF III F 693: sources of money-making (no book-number)
- SVF III F 701 and F 579: fees for lecturing (no book-number)

Chrysippus' approach to the right way of life is pragmatic. In describing this lifestyle, he frequently seems to react to Epicurus. In SVF III F 693 = Plut. *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 20,1043e, Chrysippus discusses three sources of money-making (χρηματισμός): kingship, friends and lecturing. A similar division is found in Arius Didymus' summary of Stoic moral doctrines in Stob. 2,7,11m, p. 109–110 Wachsmuth (= SVF III F 686), which lists money-making based on kingship (either by being a king or by receiving money from a king), politics (which includes money-making based on friends) and lecturing. Money-making through lectures is further explained in two fragments of Chrysippus' Περὶ βίων (SVF III F 693b = Plut. *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 30,1047f and SVF III F 701):⁷⁰ the wise man should collect fees either by payment in advance or by contract.⁷¹ Money-making through kingship is treated in SVF III F 691, where Chrysippus says that the wise man will gain money by assuming kingship or, if he cannot reign himself, by living with a king. As an example, he mentions the courts of the Scythian king Idanthyrsus and of Leuco (the king of Pontus).⁷² This view is also found in Arius

⁷⁰ Cf. Chrysippus SVF III F 579.

⁷¹ Collecting fees for lecturing may also have been the topic of Cleanthes' work *On the Wise Man Lecturing* (Diog. Laert. 7,175 = SVF I F 481); cf. Scholz (1998) 353 n. 143.

⁷² Another fragment on money-making that may derive from Chrysippus' Περὶ βίων is SVF III F 685 (= Diog. Laert. 7,188). The manuscripts of Diogenes Laertius read ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ βίου καὶ πορισμοῦ προνοεῖν λέγων ὅπως ποριστέον τῷ σοφῷ "in the second book *On Life and Money-Making*, where he says that he considers how the wise man should make money". Von Arnim (1903) 172 suggested correcting βίου to βίων and taking περὶ βίων as the title, in which case the text reads ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ βίων καὶ πορισμοῦ προνοεῖν (sc. λέγει) λέγων ὅπως ποριστέον τῷ σοφῷ "(he says that) one may think about money-making in the second book *On Lives*, where he says how the wise man should make money". The fragment itself argues against the importance of money-making and considers gaining money from a king, from friendship and from wisdom ridiculous. Although this obviously contradicts SVF III F 693, this does not invalidate von Arnim's

Didymus' summary of Stoic doctrines on ethics in Stob. 2,7,11m, p. 111 Wachsmuth (= SVF III F 690). A similar statement is attested for Epicurus (F 1,121 Arrighetti² = Diog. Laert. 10,121b), who claims that the wise man "will make money, though only by his wisdom, if he is poor; and he will pay court to a king at the appropriate moment" (χρηματίσεσθαι τε, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας, ἀπορήσαντα. καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν).⁷³ In SVF III F 691, Chrysippus considers it appropriate for the wise man to commit suicide if he becomes blind. This time, Chrysippus is at variance with Epicurus, who claims the opposite (cf. supra).

In SVF III F 716, Chrysippus states that the wise man will fall in love with young men (ἐρασθήσεσθαι δὲ τὸν σοφὸν τῶν νέων) who show a natural endowment for virtue⁷⁴ and argues that the purpose of love is friendship, not sexual intercourse.⁷⁵ This admittance of love seems directed against the Epicureans, who did not allow the wise man to fall in love (Diog. Laert. 10,118: ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν οὐ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς "they do not approve of the wise man falling in love"). In fact, Cic. *Tusc.* 4,70 (= Chrysippus SVF III F 653) explicitly states that the Stoic view is at variance with Epicurus (*litigant cum Epicuro*).⁷⁶

Like Epicurus, Chrysippus also discusses political engagement in his work Περὶ βίῳ. In SVF III F 697, he claims that the wise man should partake in politics if nothing hinders him, a statement also found in Arius Didymus' summary of Stoic doctrines on ethics in Stob. 2,7,11m, p. 111 Wachsmuth (= Chrysippus SVF III F 690).⁷⁷ This recalls Epicurus' opposite statement that the wise man will not engage in politics unless he is forced to (cf. § 5 supra). In SVF III F 703, however, Chrysippus states that the wise man should be ἀπράγμων, i.e. not politically involved.⁷⁸ This contradiction may be explained if one assumes that Περὶ βίῳ was a dialogue (as is often assumed for Clearchus). According to Keith, Plutarch

conjecture, since a similar contradiction in Chrysippus' Περὶ βίῳ is found for political engagement and probably also for love (cf. infra).

⁷³ Cf. Lactant. *Div. inst.* 3,17,6 = Epicurus F 557 Usener. In *Sententiae Vaticanae* 67, however, Epicurus states that a free life cannot involve money-making, since one would become dependent of the mass or of a monarch.

⁷⁴ This Stoic view is also found in Chrysippus SVF III F 650–652.

⁷⁵ Cf. the Stoic definition of love in Chrysippus SVF III F 650; F 721–722. A similar definition is found in Chrysippus' *On Love* (SVF III F 718).

⁷⁶ However, the opposite view that the wise man will not fall in love is attested for Chrysippus as well (SVF III F 720: οὐκ ἐρασθήσεται ὁ σοφός). A similar statement is found in Plut. *Comm. not.* 28,1072f (= Chrysippus SVF III F 719): the Stoics regarded young men base/ugly (αἰσχρός) and wise men fair/beautiful (καλός) and claimed that a fair man will neither love nor be worth loving.

⁷⁷ Cf. also Chrysippus SVF III F 698.

⁷⁸ Cf. SVF III F 694, where Chrysippus explains his reasons for not partaking in politics.

misrepresents Chrysippus' views: Chrysippus means that a wise man will not be meddlesome, not that he should withdraw from politics.⁷⁹

Thus far, I have argued that several fragments contain a polemic against Epicurus. Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίων* may also have reacted against Aristotle. In *SVF* III F 702, Chrysippus argues that the "leisured life" (βίος σχολαστικός) amounts to nothing more than the life of pleasure (βίος ἡδονικός). This statement echoes a passage in *Arist. Eth. Nic.* 10,7,7,1177b, where Aristotle dubs the contemplative life σχολαστικός and states that this life contains pleasure.⁸⁰ A reaction to the Aristotelian system of the three lifestyles seems to underlie another fragment of Chrysippus (*SVF* III F 687), which does not cite a book-title. Chrysippus distinguishes three types of life: the contemplative (θεωρητικός), the active (πρακτικός) and the rational life (λογικός), seemingly eliminating the sensual life from the discussion.⁸¹ The rational life (presumably synonymous with the life according to virtue and the life according to nature)⁸² was conceived as a combination of contemplation (θεωρία) and action (πρᾶξις), i.e. a combination of the first two lives.⁸³ This preference for the rational life may be a polemical reaction to Aristotle (although a combination of the two lifestyles is already anticipated in Aristotle and Theophrastus, cf. § 2 and § 4 *supra*).⁸⁴

The fragments discussed thus far all treat the right way of life, albeit with a practical orientation. It should be stressed with Scholz and Keith that with these instructions Chrysippus does not exhort people to practise politics or start living with kings *vel. sim.*, but probably wants to show that different lifestyles (life at a court, a politically engaged life, life as a lecturer) are compatible with a philosophical life.⁸⁵ Two fragments from *Περὶ βίων* have no direct link with this topic.

⁷⁹ Keith (2013) 261–262.

⁸⁰ According to Grilli (1953) 94–95 and Joly (1956) 141, the fragment reacts to Epicurus.

⁸¹ Another classification is found in Arius Didymus' summary of Stoic moral doctrines in *Stob.* 2,7,11m, p. 109 Wachsmuth (= Chrysippus *SVF* III F 686), viz. the royal life (βίος βασιλικός), the political life (βίος πολιτικός) and the scientific life (βίος ἐπιστημονικός), but this is probably a projection of the three types of money-making (ἀπὸ βασιλείας, ἀπὸ πολιτείας and ἀπὸ σοφιστείας).

⁸² Cf. Joly (1956) 145.

⁸³ This idea is also found in *SVF* III F 295 (from Chrysippus' *On Virtues*), according to which a virtuous man both contemplates what he has to do and puts this into practice (τὸν γὰρ ἐνάρετον θεωρητικὸν τε εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ποιητέων). A related concept is that of virtue as being both theoretical and practical in Chrysippus *SVF* III F 202 (ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ καὶ θεωρητικὴ ἐστὶ καὶ πρακτικὴ) and Panaetius *F* 54 Alesse.

⁸⁴ The idea of a 'mixed' life (a combination of the active and contemplative life) is also found in Arius Didymus' summary of the moral doctrines of Aristotle and the *Peripatetics* in *Stob.* 2,7,24, p. 144–145 Wachsmuth.

⁸⁵ Scholz (1998) 349–350; Keith (2013) 259–260. Cf. also Bréhier (1951) 51–52.

In *SVF* II F 42, Chrysippus analyses philosophy as consisting of logic, ethics and physics and instructs that it should be studied in this order.⁸⁶ *SVF* II F 270 warns against arguing *in utramque partem*, since this leads to confusion. Both fragments probably give instructions on how the wise man living from his lectures should teach. Finally, it is unclear whether biographical examples played a role of any significance in Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίωv* (as in Clearchus). In one case, a historical example is cited (viz. the Scythian Idanthysus and Leuco of Pontus in *SVF* III F 691), but it is unclear whether Chrysippus elaborated on this example or just briefly mentioned it.

7 Imperial Authors

In the Roman period, works *Περὶ βίωv* were written by Timotheus of Athens (*FGrHist* 1079 F 1–4) and Seleucus of Alexandria (*FGrHist* 1056 F 1). The one extant fragment of Seleucus, who lived under Tiberius,⁸⁷ is cited by Harpocration and discusses the origin of the Homeridae (a Chian family), explaining it on the basis of an anecdote.⁸⁸ The fragments of Timotheus (undated)⁸⁹ all concern physical weaknesses of philosophers: Plato had a weak voice, Speusippus suffered from phthiriasis, Aristotle spoke with a lisp and Zeno had a twisted neck. According to Radicke, these biographical anecdotes illustrate the philosophers' superiority of mind as opposed to their bodily deficiencies.⁹⁰ Finally, Plutarch too wrote a work *Περὶ βίωv* (Lamprias 105; 159), but no fragments have been preserved.

⁸⁶ This tripartite division of philosophy is found in Chrysippus *SVF* II F 37. It was adopted by Zeno (*SVF* I F 45) from the Academics and is also attributed to Apollodorus of Seleucia (*SVF* III F 1) and Eudromus (*SVF* III F 1). According to another fragment (*SVF* II F 43), Chrysippus' advocated the order logic–physics–ethics, like Zeno (*SVF* I F 46), Eudromus (*SVF* III F 2), Diogenes of Babylon (*SVF* III F 16) and Posidonius (F 87–88 Edelstein/Kidd = F 252a–b Theiler). According to Steinmetz (1994) 593, Chrysippus' order logic–physics–ethics is systematic and the order logic–ethics–physics didactic. Cleanthes (*SVF* I F 482) divided philosophy into dialectics, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics and theology.

⁸⁷ Cf. *FGrHist* 1056 T 2.

⁸⁸ The name Homeridae was derived from “hostages” (ὑμηροί), since once at the Dionysia the Chian women became mad and attacked the men. They did not stop until they gave each other grooms and brides as hostages. Their descendants were thus called Homeridae.

⁸⁹ Timotheus cannot be dated with certainty, but Radicke (1999) 250 suggested the second or third century AD. All the fragments of Timotheus are quoted by Diogenes Laertius (who wrote in the middle of the third century AD).

⁹⁰ Radicke (1999) 250.

8 Conclusion

Let us now return to the two main theories on the nature of works *Περὶ βίωv*, viz. collections of biographies or philosophical treatises. A major problem with *Περὶ βίωv* works is that they are not transmitted equally. Clearchus is mainly preserved through Athenaeus, who is primarily interested in sensational anecdotes. Dicaearchus' one fragment is cited by Diogenes Laertius. Epicurus' fragments have been transmitted by Diogenes Laertius and Philodemus, the latter himself being preserved poorly so that the fragments in question are often difficult or impossible to read. Chrysippus' fragments are cited by Diogenes Laertius and Plutarch, the latter only selecting material in order to refute Chrysippus. The one fragment of Seleucus is found in Harpocration. Timotheus' fragments, finally, are found in Diogenes Laertius. In other words, the image resulting from the fragments depends on or is at least influenced by the personal choices of the source-authors and may therefore be misleading. The only bridge between the authors under discussion is Diogenes Laertius, who did not even know most of these works directly; and regardless of this, it only concerns one fragment of Dicaearchus, three fragments of Epicurus, two fragments of Chrysippus and the four fragments of Timotheus.

Despite these limitations, the fragments do allow us to draw some conclusions. The fragments of Epicurus and Chrysippus are clearly philosophical, only rarely mentioning something anecdotal.⁹¹ The fragments of Clearchus and the imperial authors mainly consist of anecdotes; nevertheless, it seems rash to assume a collection of biographies in the modern sense (i.e. a description of the life of an individual from birth to death). Furthermore, the biographical fragments of Dicaearchus on philosophers have been used too rashly to support the 'biographical' theory: only one fragment actually cites the title *On Lives*. The common denominator for most fragments of *Περὶ βίωv* literature is the philosophical question of the right way of life. Thus, we may conclude that *Περὶ βίωv* works primarily treated one or several modes of life. The anecdotes in Clearchus probably served as *exempla*, which explains their moralistic tendency. Indeed, the Peripatetics may have been more inclined to use biographical anecdotes,⁹² which is not surprising, since biographical and antiquarian studies were popular in this school.

⁹¹ Cf. Liebich (1960) 111–117.

⁹² Cf. Erler (1994) 86; Scholz (1998) 257 n. 11.

A similar picture arises from works entitled *On Pleasure*.⁹³ The fragments of Heraclides Ponticus⁹⁴ and Theophrastus⁹⁵ adduce many (biographical) anecdotes on individuals and nations in their discussions of pleasure and decadence without comprising real biographies: Heraclid. Pont. F 39 (on the Persians and Medes and on Athens), F 40 (on a certain Thrasyllus), F 41 (on Samos and Sybaris), F 42 (on Callias, Nicias and Epicles), F 43 (on Pericles), F 44 (on a perfume-seller called Dinias) Schütrumpf and Theophr. F 549 (on the Ionians), F 550 (on Smindyrides), F 551 (on Smindyrides, Sardanapalus, Agesilaus and Ananis), F 553 (on Aeschylus) *FHS&G*. The same holds true for two fragments of Heraclides' work *On Justice*: F 22 Schütrumpf mentions the Sybarites and the tyranny of Telys; F 23 Schütrumpf treats the luxurious lifestyle of the Milesians. Some of the examples in Heraclides and Theophrastus recur in Clearchus' *On Lives* (e.g. the Persians, Medes, Sybarites, Milesians). Like Clearchus, Heraclides also inserts poetic quotations as 'evidence', e.g. the quotations from Simonides, Pindar and Homer in F 39 Schütrumpf cited by a proponent of the life of pleasure. Clearchus' *On Lives* too may have been a dialogue, in which one of the interlocutors defended the sensual life (cf. F 41–42 Wehrli²). The few fragments *On Pleasure* of the Stoics Cleanthes and Chrysippus, by contrast, give a more purely philosophical impression and do not cite anecdotes.⁹⁶

Thus, behind Clearchus' anecdotes, we should probably assume a more theoretical issue (in which Athenaeus was generally less interested).⁹⁷ Such a philosophical interest is reflected in Clearchus' fragment on the Pythagorean Euxitheus (F 38 Wehrli²). Since certain topics, such as political involvement, suicide and pleasure, recur in several authors, *Περὶ βίῳ*n works were probably the ideal place for debate and polemic against competing schools. As I have tried to show, several fragments of Chrysippus' *Περὶ βίῳ*n seem to react to the views of

⁹³ Cf. already Wehrli (1969c) 118–120; Cooper (2002) 329–330; Tsitsiridis (2008) 72 and (2013) 169; 171–172. The title is also attested (without fragments) for Antisthenes (SSR V A F 41), Speusippus (T 1 Tarán), Xenocrates (F 1,12 Isnardi Parente), Aristotle (ap. Diog. Laert. 5,22; 5,24; 5,4 = p. 3; 5 Rose³ = p. 22–23 Gigon and ap. Hesychius Milesius *Vita Aristotelis* p. 83 Düring = p. 11 Rose³ = p. 26 Gigon), Strato (F 1,59 Sharples) and Dionysius of Heracleis (ap. Diog. Laert. 7,167).

⁹⁴ On Heraclides' work *On Pleasure*, cf. especially Bringmann (1972); Gottschalk (1980) 89–93; Schütrumpf (2009).

⁹⁵ Theophrastus' work *On Pleasure* was also attributed to Chamaeleon: cf. Theophr. F 550; F 553 *FHS&G* = Chamaeleon F 8–9 Martano.

⁹⁶ Cleanthes *SVF* I F 552; 558; Chrysippus *SVF* III F 156.

⁹⁷ Clearchus' work is often said to be centred around the pair ἡδονή–ἀρετή. Cf. Wehrli (1969b) 58; Tsitsiridis (2008) 72. Incidentally, according to Epicurus (F 22,4 Arrighetti²), ἀρετή is only desirable in as far as it is related to ἡδονή.

Epicurus and Aristotle.⁹⁸ The title of Plutarch's work *On Lives against Epicurus* (*Περὶ βίων πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον*) (Lamprias 159)⁹⁹ also suggests a polemic against Epicurus (possibly against Epicurus' *Περὶ βίων*). On the other hand, the fragments of Epicurus and Chrysippus show that works entitled *Περὶ βίων* were not restricted to a discussion of the Aristotelian βίος θεωρητικός, βίος πρακτικός and βίος ἀπολαυστικός and the importance of political engagement. Contrary to the Peripatetics and the imperial writers, Epicurus and Chrysippus did not take an anecdotal approach but instead gave practical instructions on the right way of life.

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⁹⁸ Joly (1956) 144 believed in a strong parallelism between Chrysippus' and Epicurus' *Περὶ βίων*: both works consist of four books, of which the first treats the wise man's political involvement.

⁹⁹ Lamprias 105 also lists a work *Περὶ βίων· ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ Περὶ τοῦ τὸν βίον εὐκέναι κυβεῖα* “*On Lives: in another copy On Life Being Like a Game of Dice*”. It is uncertain whether this is the same work.

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